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Vikram Chand*
In 2019, the OECD released a public consultation document and its work program that address the tax challenges raised by the digitalization of
the economy. These documents essentially discuss proposals that either address the allocation of taxing rights (Pillar I) or unresolved Base Erosion of
Profit Shifting issues (Pillar II). Regarding Pillar I, three solutions were proposed: user participation, significant economic presence, as well as the
marketing intangibles approach. The purpose of this contribution is to assess the Pillar I proposals considering their policy rationale and the broadly
agreed tax policy principles by tax administrations. In light of the assessment, the author takes the view that the marketing intangible proposal,
which seems to apply to consumer (or user) facing businesses, could be the most appropriate solution to address the issue of the allocation of taxing
rights. However, that proposal incites several issues concerning its profit allocation mechanism. Thus, in order to achieve tax certainty, the
contribution offers a potential solution for implementing the consumer (or user) facing proposal, that is, to resort to a simplified residual profit split
method that is based on operating profit margins of a MNE Group . The article provides a high-level overview of the design of the mechanism and
briefly addresses issues related to scope and nexus as well as rules that deal with elimination of double taxation.
1 THE PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THIS
CONTRIBUTION
1. In February 2019, the OECD released a public
consultation document1 (PCD) that addresses the tax
challenges raised by the digitalization of the econ-
omy. The PCD essentially discusses proposals that
either address the allocation of taxing rights (Pillar I)
or unresolved Base Erosion of Profit Shifting (BEPS)
issues (Pillar II). Thereafter, in May 2019, the
OECD/G20 inclusive framework released its work
programme to develop a consensus-based solution
for both issues.2 The purpose of this contribution is
to assess the Pillar I proposals contained in the PCD
and to propose the design of a potential profit allo-
cation solution, especially considering the OECD’s
work program.
2. The contribution is structured as follows. In sec-
tion 2, the author summarizes the current framework
for taxing cross border business income. Section 3
addresses the issue of allocation of taxing rights.
Section 4 depicts the assessment framework for the
proposals. In section 5, the author assesses the three
Pillar I proposals considering the assessment frame-
work, that is, their policy rationale as well as broadly
agreed tax policy principles by tax administrations.
Thereafter, section 6 proposes a high-level design of a
profit allocation solution in the form of a simplified
residual profit split method . In section 7, the author
briefly examines his opinion on fundamental reforms
that are being discussed to solve the allocation of taxing
rights issue. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR TAXING
CROSS BORDER BUSINESS INCOME: ‘SUPPLY’
OR ‘SUPPLY-DEMAND’?
3. Under the current international corporate tax fra-
mework, business income is generally ‘sourced’ in the
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State where an enterprise conducts business or eco-
nomic activities with its production factors (such as
employees).3 Therefore, if an enterprise (Company R)
produces in one State (Country R, the State in which it
is a tax resident) and sells in another State (Country S)
on a remote basis, then corporate tax on that business
income is only payable in the former State (Country R).
4. The history of the framework can be traced back
to the work undertaken by the League of Nations
(LON). Specifically, the LON had appointed four
economists to study the issue of double taxation
who introduced their report in 1923.4 With respect
to business enterprises/commercial establishments,
the economists came to the conclusion that such
income should be taxed in the State where an enter-
prise has its ‘origin’ factors.5 Origin of income is
typically the place where ‘earnings are created’ by
human agency.6 These findings were reiterated in
subsequent reports produced by the LON as well as
draft conventions for prevention of double taxation.7
5. In 2005, the OECD once again discussed this
framework in its report on Ecommerce.8
Essentially, the OECD analysed the question as to
whether the international corporate tax base should
be allocated among States based on the ‘supply’
approach or ‘supply-demand’ approach.9 Under the
former approach, business income is allocated to
the State where the enterprise has its ‘production’ or
‘origin’ factors. This would imply that demand fac-
tors provided by a market jurisdiction such as the
presence of a consumer market or a consumer base
that is able to pay for goods and services due to
efficient functioning of that State are irrelevant for
allocating the corporate tax base among States.10
On the other hand, under the latter approach, the
presence of demand factors plays an important role
in the allocation of the corporate tax base as profits
can only be earned from the interaction between
supply and demand factors.11 Several members of
the Technical Advisory Group Members (TAG
Committee) concluded that the former approach
should be preferred. The report states, ‘a large
majority … implicitly rejected the ‘supply-demand’
approach. For them, the mere fact that the realization
of business transactions requires an interaction between the
supply of goods or services by an enterprise and the demand
Notes
3 K. Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income: A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Parts II), 16(10) Intertax 310, 320 (1988); K. Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation
of Income: A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 16(11) Intertax 393, 398 (1988); A. Schäfer & C. Spengel, ICT and International Taxation: Tax Attributes and Scope
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the Issues and a Plea for an Origin-Based Approach, 60(11) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 430, 433–437 (2006); M. Devereux, Taxation of Outbound Direct Investment: Economic Principles and
Tax Policy Considerations, 24(4) Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol’y 698, 712–715 (2008); L. U. Cavelti, C. Jaag & T. F. Rohner, Why Corporate Taxation Should Mean Source Taxation: A
Response to the OECD’s Actions Against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 9(3) World Tax J. 352, 352–354 (2017); W. Schön, Ten Questions About Why and How to Tax the
Digitalized Economy, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working paper 2017, 11, 22 (2018); J. Becker & J. Englisch, Taxing Where Value Is Created:
What’s ‘User Involvement’ Got to Do with It?, 47(2) Intertax 161, 163–164 (2019).
4 G. Bruins et al., Report on Double Taxation: Submitted to the Financial Committee. Document E.F.S.73.F.19 (League of Nations 1923).
5 Bruins et al., supra n. 4, at 29–32 and 39–40.
6 Ibid., at 22–25.
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taxtreatieshistory.org/ (accessed 27 July 2019). For a detailed analysis of these reports, see R. Collier & J. Andrus, Transfer Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle Ch. 1 (Oxford
University Press 2017).
8 OECD, E-Commerce: Transfer Pricing and Business Profits Taxation, No. 10, OECD Tax Policy Studies (OECD Publishing 2005).
9 Ibid., para. 40.
10 Several academics/commentators seem to support the ‘supply’ approach. For instance: Vogel argues exclusively for ‘source’ taxation of business income. Source in this context
means the place where the economic activities take place. See Vogel, supra n. 3. Other commentators include: Schäfer & Spengel, supra n. 3, at 11–12; Kemmeren, supra n. 3,
at 435; Caveti, Jaag & Rohner, supra n. 3, at 352–354. Although it is not extremely clear, it seems that Professor W. Schön also supports this approach in one of his
contributions, see Schön, supra n. 3, at 16–24. Also see Becker & Englisch, supra n. 3, at 163–164; Moreover, see US: Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic
Commerce, Department of Treasury, 21–27 (1996); UK: HM Treasury, Corporate Tax and the Digital Economy: Position Paper Update, ss 2.26–2.32 (2018); Coalition of
Netherlands based Technology Companies, at 8; Digital Economy Group, at 7.
11 Several academics/commentators seem to support the ‘supply-demand’ approach. See R. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52(3) Tax L. Rev. 507, 538–542
(1997); A. Miller, Taxing Cross-Border Services: Current Worldwide Practices and the Need for Change, Doctoral Series vol. 37, 52–59 (IBFD 2014); P. Hongler & P. Pistone, Blueprints
for a New PE Nexus to Tax Business Income in the Era of the Digital Economy, IBFD White Paper, 33–34 (2015); M. de Wilde, Comparing Tax Policy Responses for the Digitalizing
Economy: Fold Or All-In, 46(6/7) Intertax 466, 471; M. Devereux & J. Vella, Value Creation as a the Fundamental Principle of the International Corporate Tax system, Eur. Tax Pol’y
Forum, ss 2–4 (2018); W. Hellerstein, A US Subnational Perspective on the ‘Logic’ of Taxing Income on a ‘Market’ Basis, 72(4/5) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 293, s. 3 (2018); S. Gadžo, Nexus
Requirements for Taxation of Non-Residents’ Business Income, Doctoral Series vol. 42, 272–273 (IBFD 2018); E. Escribano, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporate Income Pursuant to the Presumptive
Benefit Principle, Series On International Taxation Vol. 70, 42–47 (Wolters Kluwer 2019). Arguably, commentators who argue for withholding tax solutions could also be
considered to be the supporters of such an approach. See A. Baez & Y. Brauner, Taxing the Digital Economy Post BEPS … Seriously, University of Florida Levin College of Law
Research Paper No. 19-16 (2019).
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in a market state has not historically been considered by
countries to provide a sufficient link for considering that
the profits of the enterprise arising from these transactions
should, for purposes of income taxation, be sourced in the
market state … The TAG’s approach was therefore in
line with the supply-based approach of considering that
business profits should be viewed as originating from the
location of the factors that allow the enterprise to realize
business profits. It therefore rejected the suggestion that the
mere fact that a country provides the market where an
enterprise’s goods and services are supplied should allow
that country to consider that a share of the profits of the
enterprise is derived therefrom’ .12 This said, the coun-
try that preferred the ‘supply-demand’ approach was
India’.13
6. It also appears as though the BEPS project has
reinforced the application of the ‘supply’ frame-
work. To elaborate, one of the core objectives of
the BEPS project was to ensure that profits are
taxed where ‘economic activities take place and value is
created’.14 In this regard, several actions of the
BEPS plan have reinforced the application of activ-
ity-based concepts. For example, Actions 8–10
now provide detailed guidance on the concept of
control over risk,15 Action 5 introduced the sub-
stantial activities test,16 and BEPS Action 617
provides that treaty benefits will only be granted
to taxpayer structures that are linked to core com-
mercial activity.18 Accordingly, if a corporate tax-
payer’s personnel, such as employees, performs
relevant activities in Country R (assuming
Country R is also the State of its tax residence)
and sells in another State on a remote basis, busi-
ness income is taxed only in the former State.19
Arguably, this objective also supports the applica-
tion of the ‘supply’ approach as opposed to a ‘sup-
ply-demand’ approach. In fact, several
commentators are clear with the fact that the
reference to the concept of ‘value creation’ in the
BEPS project implies taxation in the country
where the ‘supply’ or ‘production’ factors are present.
However, they question whether the concept can
be broadened in order to include ‘demand’ or ‘mar-
ket’ factors20 (nonetheless, see the discussion in section 3
that is made from the supplier’s perspective). As dis-
cussed by Professor Kemmeren, such an approach
would comply with the ‘benefits’ principle21 (in
particular, the direct benefits principle)22 in the
sense that the income is taxed by the State that
provides/enables the taxpayer to produce goods or
services with its physical or legal infrastructure.
This being stated, it should not be overlooked
that, in most scenarios, the latter State imposes
indirect taxes such as Value Added Tax (VAT) on
consumption by a consumer base in accordance
with the destination principle.23
7. On the other hand, from a corporate tax per-
spective, when Company R from Country R con-
ducts business in Country S through ‘origin’,
‘supply’, or ‘value creation’ factors therein (such as its
Notes
12 OECD, supra n. 8, at paras 41–42.
13 See IN: Ministry of Finance of India, E-commerce and Taxation Report, Circular No.1/2004, 146–147 (2 Jan. 2004). In our opinion, this is the core reason that India asserts
‘more’ taxation of income that arises from its borders. For instance, several Indian tax treaties contain a provision that deals with fees for technical services or included services.
Arguably, India has not yet implemented the supply – demand approach for the sale of goods.
14 OECD, BEPS Project Explanatory Statement – 2015 Final Reports, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing Oct. 2015), para. 1. For a critical
analysis of BEPS Transfer Pricing recommendations, see Collier & Andrus, supra n. 7, at Ch. 7.
15 OECD, Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Revised Guidelines on Action 8-10, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing Oct.
2015), paras 1.65–1.67.
16 OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting Project (OECD Publishing Oct. 2015), Ch. 4.
17 OECD, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, Action 6 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD
Publishing Oct. 2015).
18 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017): Commentary on Article 29, para. 181.
19 V. Chand & B. Malek, The Relevant Economic Activity Test and Its Impact on International Corporate Tax Policy, 3 BTR (2019); E. C. C. M. Kemmeren, If We Need a Destination-
Based Corporate Income Tax, Do We also Need a Production-Based Consumption Tax?, in International Taxation in a Changing Landscape – Liber Amicorum in Honour of Bertil Wiman,
Series on International Taxation vol. 71, 154–156 (J. Monsenego & J. Bjuvberg eds, Kluwer Law International 2019).
20 For a discussion on the issue, see J. Hey, ‘Taxation Where Value Is Created’ and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative, 72(4/5) Bull. Int’l Tax’n s. 2 (2018); S.
Morse, Value Creation: A Standard in Search of a Process, 72(4/5) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 196, 196–198 (2018); Devereux & Vella, supra n. 11, at ss 2–3. The latter authors, who
unnecessarily stretch this concept, also question whether the standard supports taxation in the ultimate shareholder State of the relevant entity.
21 For a critical analysis on the ‘Benefit Principle’, see W. Schön, International Coordination for a Second-Best World (Part I), 1(1) World Tax J. 67, at 67–70 (2009). Moreover,
Professor Arnold and Professor Sasseville argue that compliance and administrative concerns could be relevant to arrive at this conclusion. See B. J. Arnold & J. Sasseville, Source
Rules for Taxing Business Profits Under Tax Treaties, in The Taxation of Business Profits Under Tax Treaties 109–130 (B. J. Arnold, J. Sasseville & E. M. Zolt eds, Canadian Tax
Foundation 2003). Also see A. P. Dourado, In Search of an International Tax System in a Post-BEPS Tax Competition Setting, 47(1) Intertax 2 (2019).
22 Kemmeren, supra n. 19, at 156.
23 For a detailed discussion on the destination principle, see OECD, International VAT/GST Guidelines, paras 1.8–1.15 (OECD Publishing Apr. 2017); On the issue, also see
Schön, supra n. 3, at 18; Becker & Englisch, supra n. 3, at 164.
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employees), then the latter State is justified in taxing
that business income. This is because the factors
either ‘benefit’ from that States (1) physical infrastruc-
ture (for example, roads, highways, police, defence,
and so on); or (2) legal infrastructure (for example,
presence of a legal framework for conducting
business).24 From a taxable nexus perspective, the
value creation factors (such as employees) in
Country S could either be a part of the same enter-
prise (such as a permanent establishment)25 or a
separate related entity. From a profit allocation per-
spective, transfer pricing rules, which are based on
the arm’s length principle, are typically employed to
allocate profits to the separate related entity26 or to
the permanent establishment.27 These rules allocate
profits to the taxable nexus based on the functions,
assets, and corresponding risks (FAR). However,
with respect to the permanent establishments, the
author would like to emphasize that, depending on
the actual tax treaty and State practices, formulary
approaches may also be used.28 Nevertheless, in the
majority of situations, the current nexus and profit
allocation rules are linked to physical presence
requirements (in particular, presence of personnel).
This is where the debate/tension begins.
3 THE ALLOCATION OF TAXING RIGHTS
ISSUE: THE ONGOING SHIFT FROM
TANGIBLE TO INTANGIBLE PRESENCE
8. With the rise of digitalization, there is the
growing concern that companies of a
Multinational Group (MNE), especially highly
digitalized businesses (HDB), can centralize opera-
tions and sell their products/services on a remote
basis (especially over the internet) and derive sub-
stantial business income from other countries
(Market Country or Market State) without any
physical presence of personnel or with minimal
presence therein. Moreover, some businesses can
use digital technologies to collect data from users
of a platform or end consumers with the ultimate
objective of enhancing and commercializing their
own product/service offering. Arguably, operating
without or with less physical presence and collect-
ing data is also possible due to the fact that com-
panies rely extensively on intangibles in the digital
age.29 Taking into consideration these features,
from a tax policy standpoint, the question arises of
how the Market Country can tax the business
income of an enterprise operating in the digital
space. This is because the manner in which business
is conducted and where value creation takes place
has evolved and is evolving from tangible to an
intangible/non-tangible presence.30
9. While international policy making organiza-
tions such as the OECD, the EU Commission, and
the UN have proposed ideas to resolve the issue,
several States have begun introducing unilateral
measures either targeting (1) HDBs31; or (2) all
enterprises.32 In order to limit the rise of
unilateralism,33 the PCD offered the following
three solutions that are to be analysed on a ‘without
prejudice’ basis: the user participation, the significant
economic presence (SEP), and the marketing intan-
gibles approach. Prior to assessing those proposals,
an initial question arises as to why the Market State
should tax the business income of a non-resident if
that income has been derived only on a remote basis.
Otherwise stated, can the Market Country tax the
business income of a foreign supplier in the absence
of presence (with personnel) in that country?
10. From the perspective of applying the ‘“benefit”
principle, it could be argued that a non-resident
supplier that does not have any physical presence in
Notes
24 D. Pinto, E-Commerce and Source-Based Income Taxation, Doctoral Series Vol. 6, s. 2.2.1 (IBFD 2003).
25 See Art. 5 OECD Model Tax Convention (2017).
26 See Art. 9(1) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017).
27 See Art. 7(2) OECD Model Tax Convention (2017). Also see OECD, Ctr. for Tax Policy & Admin., 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (OECD
Publishing 2010). This report provides detailed guidance the interpretation of Art. 7(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention. See OECD Model Tax Convention (2017):
Commentary on Art. 7, paras 8–9.
28 See Art. 7(4) OECD Model Tax Convention (2008).
29 OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS,, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing
2018), para. 34.
30 Ibid., para. 397
31 Digital service taxes are currently being implemented/discussed in countries such as Austria, France, Italy, the UK, and Spain. For a critical analysis of these taxes, see A.
Turina, Which ‘Source Taxation’ for the Digital Economy?, 46(6/7) Intertax 495–519 (2018).
32 For example, diverted profit taxes introduced in the UK and Australia or the Significant Economic Presence test introduced in India.
33 OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 11.
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the Market Country does not benefit directly from
that country’s physical infrastructure. In fact, some
members of the TAG committee were of this opi-
nion when discussing the ‘supply’ approach. The
report states that a number of members contended
that the Market Country is justified to tax only when
‘ … the enterprise carries on activities thereon’.34
11. On the other hand, it could also be argued
that, although the non-resident supplier does not
have direct access to tangible infrastructure, it does
have access to the legal infrastructure of the Market
Country. Professor Dale Pinto emphasizes in his doc-
toral thesis that protection of intangible property
(IP) is critical for enterprises operating in the digital
era. Therefore, if the Market Country offers an appro-
priate IP protection legal framework and considering
the fact that IP plays an important role in the
digitalized economy, it could be argued that the
non-resident enterprise (NRE) or the MNE to
which the NRE belongs indeed receives a benefit.
Therefore, the Market Country is justified in taxing
as it provides a direct benefit, that is, a legal frame-
work that enables efficient conducting of business.35
Importantly, some members of the TAG committee
concurred with this opinion when discussing the
‘supply’ approach. The OECD TAG report states
that, for some members, ‘source taxation is justified in
such a case because the business profits of the foreign
enterprise derive partly from the enterprise’s use of impor-
tant locational advantages provided by that country’s
infrastructure which make the business operations profit-
able. These may include, but are not limited to … , a legal
system that ensure the protection of property rights and a
financial infrastructure.’36 Moreover, it could be
argued that the NREs (especially digital businesses)
benefit from the Market Country’s telecommunica-
tion infrastructure as that infrastructure enables the
NRE to sell over the internet or collect data from
users of a platform or end consumers.
12. Considering the above discussion, the author
takes the position that the ‘supply’ framework or
‘value creation’ standard should, as a start, be seen
from a supplier’s perspective. This would imply
that the framework/standard clearly permits taxa-
tion in the supply State in the traditional sense
(the State where the firm performs its activities
with its personnel). This also implies that the
framework/standard permits taxation in the
Market Country to the extent that the non-resi-
dent supplier has created value in that State. In
this context, the framework/standard act as ‘source’
rules. Under this line of thinking, it should be
noted that the presence of personnel in the Market
Country is not a precondition for exercising taxing
rights by that State.37 The ‘source’ of income could
be an intangible factor that has been developed by
the firm, for instance, market related intangibles
linked to that State such as customer intangibles
or user networks (as discussed in section 5.3).
13. This said, the Market Country should exercise
its tax jurisdiction only when the NRE supplier
‘actively’ intervenes and benefits from that country’s
infrastructure in order to create value for itself. From
a pragmatic perspective, nexus related thresholds
would need to be developed to indicate such active
or regular participation by the foreign supplier in
the economic life of the Market Country. If the non-
resident supplier crosses those thresholds, then prof-
its will need to be computed and allocated to the
Market Country.
4 ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
14. Also, before beginning the analysis, it should
be noted that any solution for the digitalized econ-
omy should be built on a sound policy rationale and
well-established tax policy principles (such as
those agreed in the context of the ‘Ottawa’
Notes
34 OECD, supra n. 8, at para. 45.
35 For a detailed analysis, see Pinto, supra n. 24, at s. 2.2.1. The author also argues that neutrality considerations, principles of equity as well as the concept of entitlement also
indicate that the Market Country is justified in taxing the business income. Also see D. Pinto, Exclusive Residence or Source Based Taxation – Is a New and Simpler World Tax
Order Possible?, 61(7) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 277, 288–289 (2007).
36 OECD, supra n. 8, at para. 44.
37 Professor Schön reaches a similar conclusion but on the grounds of ‘efficiency’ as opposed to ‘fairness’ considerations represented by the benefit principle or value creation
standard. See W. Schön, One Answer to Why and How to Tax the Digitalized Economy, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working paper 2010-10, 3–12
(2019). This is also the area where we differ with notable commentators that equate the supply approach or value creation standard with physical presence requirements.
Interestingly, Professor Schwarz comments ‘If value creation is just the originating cause of income or profit, then the only real analytical task today remains the continuing examination of
modern income and profit generation to identify its originating cause and the location of that cause’. See J. Schwarz, Value Creation: Old Wine in New Bottles or New Wine in Old Bottles?
(21 May 2018), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/05/21/value-creation-old-wine-new-bottles-new-wine-old-bottles/ (accessed 21 May 2019).
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Framework38). For instance, any solution should (1)
be neutral39 in the sense that it should apply to all
businesses (traditional or digital) unless certain rea-
sonable exceptions can be made; (2) be flexible40
meaning that it should take into consideration new
business models that could be precipitated by digi-
talization; (3) pursue the path of certainty and
simplicity,41 especially with respect to profit alloca-
tion; (4) be efficient in that the compliance costs
should be low for both tax administrations and
taxpayers42; and (5) be effective in the sense that
taxes can be easily collected by the tax administra-
tion and fair so that opportunities for tax avoidance
are minimized.43 This last criterion (5), which is
particularly important in relation to determining
the location of sales, will not be examined in this
contribution as all proposals are still at a conceptual
stage.
5 ASSESSING POTENTIAL POLICY SOLUTIONS
5.1 The User Participation Proposal
5.1.1 Overview
15. The proposal is premised on the policy ratio-
nale that ‘users’ create value in the value creation
process of selected digital businesses such as online
advertisers or online market places.44 For example,
consider the situation of Company F and assume that
it is a tax resident in Country R for its European
operations, and the users that maintain their profiles
on the online platform live in the UK. Essentially,
users contribute their personal data to Company F
and use that company’s online platform in return.
Thereafter, the employees in Country R process that
raw data and sell targeted advertising services to
clients all over the world. The clients then pay
advertisement fees to Company F. Another example
deals with Company A that runs a multi-sided busi-
ness model for renting properties. Assume, once
again, that it is a tax resident in Country R for its
European operations, and the accommodation seekers
and providers who are unrelated to each other are
present in the UK. Essentially, for every booking
that is made on Company A’s online platform, the
company charges intermediation fees for its services.
Under the current framework, the profit derived
from advertising or intermediation services is taxable
only in Country R as all of the production activity
takes place in that country.45 This proposal thus
contends that ‘users’ to the platform are ‘origin’, ‘sup-
ply’, or ‘value creation factors’. In other words, their
contribution leads to network effects and external-
ities and enhances the brand image and value of the
platform depending on the business. Consequently,
it seeks to allocate a part of the profits to the UK46
with predetermined formulas.
5.1.2 Assessment of the Policy Rationale
16. This policy rationale appears to be highly
debatable.47 The EU Commission, the HMRC, and
the UN Committee of Experts argue that ‘users’ can
be regarded as value creation factors. This is because
their contribution is essential for a digital business
(such as an online advertiser) to survive, operate, and
commercialize.48 However, several commentators are
critical of this view. For example, Professor Michael
Devereux and Professor John Vella argue that the data
generated from user participation is a regular
Notes
38 OECD, Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions, Report by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (OECD Publishing 1998), para. 9 (Box 2); OECD, supra n. 8, at paras
60–99; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD Publishing
Oct. 2015), paras 10–13.
39 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 38, at para. 9 (i); OECD, supra n. 8, at para. 60; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 10.
40 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 38, at para. 9 (v); OECD, supra n. 8, at paras 87–98; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 10.
41 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 38, at para. 9 (iii), OECD, supra n. 8, at paras 66–71; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 10.
42 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 38, at para. 9 (ii); OECD, supra n. 8, at paras 61–65; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 10.
43 OECD, Electronic Commerce, supra n. 38, at para. 9 (iv); OECD, supra n. 8, at paras 74–82; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 10.
44 OECD, supra n. 1, at paras 18–19; OECD, supra n. 29, at paras 37–38; UK: HM Treasury, supra n. 10, at 7–10.
45 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 20.
46 Ibid., para. 21.
47 See NZ: New Zealand Government, Options for Taxing the Digital Economy – a Government Discussion Document, para. 4.19 (June 2019).
48 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services Tax on Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, COM(2018)
148 final, 2018/0073(CNS), (21 Mar. 2018), 8–9; HM Treasury, supra n. 10, at paras 2.4–2.5; UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Tax
Issues Related to the Digitalization of the Economy: Report (Apr. 2019), para. 15. Others supporting this position include: Y. Brauner & P. Pistone, Some Comments on the Attribution
of Profits to the Digital Permanent Establishment, 72(4a) Bull. Int’l Tax’n 3 (2018).
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business input in the production process.49 Also,
Professor Johannes Becker and Professor Joachim
Englisch, in light of several examples that deal with
the traditional economy, have demonstrated that
user contributions that assist in enhancing network
effects or assist in data collection/data production
cannot be considered as ‘value creation’ factors.50
Similarly, Professor Itai Grinberg has convincingly
demonstrated with several examples (in particular,
by referring to the medical business and credit card
business) that, if ‘users’ are to be regarded as value
creation factors, then the impact of that conclusion
should not be restricted to a subset of digital busi-
nesses and should apply more broadly.51 The author
agree with these views, particularly with the fact
that raw data is a regular business input. The author
also concurs with Professor Schoen’s opinion that a
large user base only indicates that an NRE supplier
actively intervenes through its own efforts in the
Market Country52 to develop a user base (the profits
linked to this base are not taxed under the current
framework). Therefore, the entire proposal seems to
be built on a weak policy rationale.
5.1.3 Assessment in Light of Policy Principles
17. From the perspective of the application of tax
policy principles, this proposal clearly amounts to
ring fencing as it only applies to a subset of HDBs
such as social media platforms, search engines, and
intermediation platforms.53 For similar reasons, it is
also not flexible given the fact that this proposal will
not encompass future business models (such as 3D
printing) wherein digitalization may play a key
role.54 With respect to allocation of profits, the
proposal seems to reject the use of transfer pricing
rules due to their inherent subjectivity.55 As an
alternative, it suggests allocating a part of the
MNE Groups non-routine or residual profits back
to the ‘user’ country by using predetermined
formulas.56 It is stated that the formulas would
approximate the value generated by users.57 Such a
result, while being simple, could indeed eventuate
arbitrary profit allocation outcomes.58 If nexus rules
are developed based on user thresholds and if that
threshold is somehow low (for example, one hundred
thousand users as put forward for the EU
Commission59) then, arguably, this proposal would
come with excessive compliance and enforcement
costs for both taxpayers and tax administrations.
An analysis of the public comments also indicates
that this proposal is the least preferred by all
commentators.60 Therefore, in the author’s opinion,
this proposal has the least number of chances of
being adopted as a global long-term solution. This
said, several countries are currently contemplating or
are ready to adopt digital service taxes that are built
on the user participation concept as a short-term
measure. This is conceptually incorrect.
5.2 SEP Proposal
5.2.1 Overview
18. The SEP proposal is premised on the assumption
that digitalization has enabled, to an unprecedented
Notes
49 M. Devereux & J. Vella, Taxing the Digitalised Economy: Targeted or System-Wide Reform?, 4 BTR 387, 396–400 (2018). Other commentators also agree with this view. See de
Wilde, supra n. 11, at 470–471; W. Neuvel, S. Jong & Á. De Uceda, Profit Attribution Challenges in a Digital Economy – A Transfer Pricing Analysis of the EU virtual Permanent
Establishment Concept, 25(5) Int’l Transfer Pricing J. 335, 335–342 (2018). See OECD, supra n. 29, at para. 39; OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 61.
50 For a discussion on the issue, see Becker & Englisch, supra n. 3, at 166–170.
51 I. Grinberg, International Taxation in the Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing the Current Debate 20–22 (28 Oct. 2018). I. Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation, 4 BTR
413–417 (2018).
52 In the context of discussing the ‘digital investment’ proposal, Professor Schön also reaches a similar conclusion. See Schön, supra n. 3, at 26 and Schön, supra n. 37, at 18–19.
Also see Becker & Englisch, supra n. 3, at 166–170.
53 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 28; New Zealand Government, supra n. 47, at para. 4.22.
54 New Zealand Government, supra n. 47, at para. 4.33.
55 Ibid., para. 23.
56 Ibid., para. 24.
57 Ibid., para. 27.
58 Ibid., para. 4.24.
59 European Commission, Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE Laying Down Rules Relating to the Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM(2018) 147 final, 8–9
(21 Mar. 2018).
60 Only a few commentators support this proposal. For instance, see the public comments of: (1) Businesses: AstraZeneca, at 1. (2) Business associations: World Association of
Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA), at 3. (3) Academics: Hernandez (University CLAPES). See OECD, Public Comments on Consultation Document (2019),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-tax-challenges-of-digitalisation-13-14-march-2019.htm (accessed 27 July 2019).
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extent, an enterprise to actively intervene in the eco-
nomic life of another country without having signifi-
cant physical presence therein.61
19. With respect to the nexus, the proposal applies
to a NRE that exceeds a revenue threshold combined
with one or more of the following factors: user based
factors (such as the size of the user base or volume of
data collected62), digital factors (such as maintaining
a website in the local language and payment options
in the local currency63), or ‘other factors’ such as
responsibility for the final delivery of goods to cus-
tomers or the provision by the enterprise of other
support services as well as sustained marketing and
sales promotion activities.
20. With respect to resolving the profit attribu-
tion issue regarding sales that are done on a remote
basis, one approach that the proposal contemplates
is to adopt a fractional apportionment method.64 A
reference could be made to a recent draft report of
the Indian Tax Administration to understand the
application of this approach, although their
approach was mainly discussed in the context of
attributing profits to Permanent Establishment
Permanent Establishment (PE) that arise under cur-
rent treaty rules (fixed place or agency PE rules).
First, the profit derived from the Market Country
needs to be determined. The proposal contemplates
that this could be calculated by applying the global
profit rate of the MNE Group to the revenues that
are generated in a particular jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, assume that Company R from Country R,
which is in the cloud computing business, sells
remotely in India and derives gross revenue of
USD 100. Also assume that the MNE Group to
which Company R belongs makes a consolidated
operating profit margin based on its consolidated
financial accounts of 30% (consolidated operating
profit/consolidated sales). Thus, in the first step,
the profits derived from India would amount to
USD 30 (30% of USD 100).65 Second, the profits
will be apportioned based on predetermined
formulas (allocation keys). For example, the draft
report contemplates giving equal weight to
employees, assets, and sales.66 This would imply
that 67% of the profit will be allocated to
Country R (due to the presence of employees and
assets), and 33% will be allocated to India (based on
sales). Thus, approximately one third of USD 30,
i.e. USD 10, will be the profit of the SEP on which
corporate taxes will have to be paid in India.
21. Interestingly, with respect to the first step, the
Indian Tax Administration is of the opinion that
profits should be allocated to India even if the
MNE Group makes a loss at the global level. All
facts remaining the same, assume that the MNE
Group’s consolidated operating profit margin is
negative (–5%). Even in such situations, the proposal
states that the taxable base in India should, at a
minimum, be equal to 2% of Indian revenues.
Thus, profits derived from India will amount to
USD 2, and one third of those profits, (USD) 0.66,
will then be allocated to the SEP in India on which
corporate taxes will have to be paid.
22. Moreover, in the draft report, India also con-
tends that ‘users’ can be regarded as value creation
factors (a proposition that the author rejected in the
previous section). Thus, in the context of certain
digitalized businesses in which user participation
plays a significant role or a less relevant role, the
Indian proposal also considers allocating a certain
weight to users based in India. Essentially, it is
contemplated that sales will be allocated a weight
of 30%, users 10–20% (depending on whether they
are passive or active users), and the balance will be
allocated to assets and employees.67 Consequently,
the profits of Company R (as discussed above) could
be enhanced further.
23. An alternate approach entails resorting to a
deemed profit methodology.68 This method initially
considers the SEP to be equivalent to a physical
presence from which the NRE is operating a busi-
ness. Thereafter, the method determines deemed net
Notes
61 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 50; UN, supra n. 48, at para. 12.
62 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 280.
63 Ibid., para. 279.
64 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 52; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 287; UN, supra n. 48, at para. 15; Also see OECD, supra n. 2, at paras 30–31.
65 IN: Government of India, Central Board of Direct taxes, Income department, Proposal for Amendment of Rules for Profit Attribution to Permanent Establishment (CBDT 2019), at
para. 159.
66 Ibid., paras 152–158.
67 Ibid., paras 176–178. Also see European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, COM(2016) 685 final, 2016/0337 (CNS) (25 Oct. 2016).
68 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 54; OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 289.
Intertax
1030
income of the SEP by applying a ratio of presumed
expenses to the NRE’s revenue that is derived from
transactions concluded with customers in the market
jurisdiction. The ratio could be determined based on
a number of factors such as by making references to
industry profit margins of domestic taxpayers. For
example, an online advertiser (NRE) could be classi-
fied under the advertisement industry, and its SEP
could be allocated profits based on profit margins
that are derived by comparable advertisement busi-
nesses in the market State.69
24. The SEP proposal proposes using gross based
withholding taxes as a collection or enforcement
mechanism. As the withholding tax will be applied
in a non-final manner, the NRE could file a tax
return to claim a refund for any excess taxes that
have been paid.70
5.2.2 Assessment of the Policy Rationale
25. On the one hand, the proposal is premised on the
policy rationale that the State in which the non-resi-
dent is actively present through digital means is justi-
fied to exercise tax jurisdiction. This proposition seems
to be a reasonable suggestion from the perspective of
the application of the ‘benefit’ principle. Moreover, this
approach would be compliant with the opinion of one
group of the TAG Committee that expressed the view
that, under the ‘supply’ approach, theMarket Country is
justified to exercise its taxing rights even when there is
no physical presence.71
26. On the other hand, if the policy rationale of
this proposal is based on the fact that the ‘supply-
demand’ approach72 should be the conceptual base for
sharing the corporate tax base, then this would sym-
bolize a shift in the current framework, at least the
framework applied by OECD Member States.73 In
fact, as discussed previously, India74 argues for this
position. In its recent draft report on profit attribu-
tion, the Indian Tax Administration referred to the
following passage of the 1923 report of the LON to
support their position: ‘The oranges upon the trees in
California are not acquired wealth until they are picked,
and not even at that stage until they are packed, and not
even at that stage until they are transported to the place
where demand exists and until they are put where the
consumer can use them. These stages, up to the point
where wealth reaches fruition, may be shared in by differ-
ent territorial authorities’. The draft report states, ‘This
famous example only elaborates a simple principle that is
always recognized by all businessmen, that it is the market
and the demand for consumption that dictates production
and not vice versa. In other words, profits are created by
sales and not by inventories. Since it goes without saying,
production is an equally essential element to business and
no profits can be generated without production, it becomes
clear that both production and sales are essential for the
generation of profits. It also means that neither can be
ignored for the purpose of determining the profits that
would be taxable in a jurisdiction’.75
27. At the outset, it should be noted that the
example used by the four economists was only to
emphasize the issue of equitably apportioning the
taxable base among countries. The principles to
actually do so were developed in the subsequent
part of their report. To reiterate, the four econo-
mists came to the conclusion that business income
should be taxed in the ‘origin’ State. Thus, the
context in which the example is used by the
Indian Tax Administration is incorrect. Arguably,
such an approach is also not in accordance with the
‘value creation’ standard. To elaborate, this proposal
does not begin by assessing the non-resident sup-
pliers’ efforts to create value in the Market Country
but rather starts with the assumption that the pre-
sence of a market must be rewarded or that it also
drives production. Moreover, the proponents of this
proposal also appear to neglect the fact that VAT is
collected on consumption by a consumer base.76
Therefore, the SEP proposal seems to be built
based on a debatable policy rationale (at least, in
the author’s opinion).
Notes
69 OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges, supra n. 38, at para. 290.
70 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 55.
71 OECD, supra n. 8, at para. 44.
72 UN, supra n. 48, at para. 15.
73 Ibid., para. 17.
74 CBDT, supra n. 65, at Ch. 4.
75 Ibid., para. 51.
76 UN, supra n. 48, at para. 51; New Zealand Government, supra n. 47, at. paras 4.51–4.52. Also see Schön, supra n. 37, at 15–16. In the context of discussing this proposal, the
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5.2.3 Assessment in Light of Policy Principles
28. From the perspective of the application of tax
policy principles, it is rather ambiguous as to
whether the proposal applies to ‘digital businesses’
or ‘all businesses’.77 A recent UN document indi-
cates that the proposal could apply only to the
former category of businesses, in particular,
HDBs.78 Thus, it may amount to ring fencing
and could be non-neutral.79 Similarly, non-neutral
outcomes will exist if collection mechanisms (such
as withholding taxes) are applied only for pay-
ments made to HDBs as opposed to traditional
cross border trade.
29. Assuming that the proposal applies only to
HDBs, if the nexus definition of the SEP is drafted
in specific terms, that is, by referring to various thresh-
olds (revenue, users or otherwise) as opposed to a
general concept, it could also be inflexible. Arguably,
the profit attribution mechanism would be simple to
implement if the new rules are based on predetermined
formulas or deemed profit mechanisms. However, such
rules may be inflexible to the extent that they do not
take into account the actual facts and circumstances of
the particular business. Thus, the proposals’ profit
allocation mechanisms could lead to arbitrary out-
comes that may not accord with transfer pricing
rules. Moreover, if the rules seek to levy taxes on the
revenues derived by loss making companies (as con-
templated by India), then they would breach ‘principles
of economic capacity and net basis taxation’.80
30. With respect to implementation, if the SEP
nexus is implemented by amending the PE definition,
an issue arises as to how the SEP proposal interacts
with the fixed place or agency PE concept and their
related attribution rules. If the new rules apply only
to HDBs, then it would be required to establish ‘rules
of order’ to resolve the issue of which provision applies
first. The coexistence of all of these rules could also
imply that MNEs may plan and fragment their activ-
ities to take advantage of different PE rules. A similar
issue arises with respect to coordination with existing
profit attribution rules. Under the current framework,
some States apply the separate entity principle to
allocate profits to a PE (for instance, Germany and
Japan have adopted the Authorized OECD approach).
However, a number of other States apply formulary
approaches (for instance, as argued by India). If the
new SEP rules are based on formulas, then it is
difficult to foresee that States that follow the arm’s
length principle will agree to such predetermined
formulas, especially the weights that must be allo-
cated to employees, assets, or sales. Moreover, several
issues arise with respect to the interaction of the SEP
PE with other treaty distributive rules that contain
the PE provision. To summarize, the SEP concept
raises several challenges from a tax policy perspective.
This said, several commentators to the PCD, particu-
larly non-governmental organizations and trade
unions, support this proposal.81
5.3 Marketing Intangibles Proposal
5.3.1 Overview
31. The marketing intangibles proposal is pre-
mised on the policy rationale that a traditional or
digital NRE can be actively present in the Market
Country on a remote basis (digitally) or through a
local presence (limited presence) to develop existing
or new marketing intangibles such as brands, trade
names, customer data, customer lists, and customer
relationships.82 For example, Company R (tradi-
tional or digital) in Country R (the country in
which it produces its goods or services) could either
be present in Country S on a remote basis or have a
local presence (branch or company). In the former
scenario, Company R could, through sales and
Notes
77 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 51.
78 UN, supra n. 48, at 11 & 14.
79 New Zealand Government, supra n. 47, at para. 4.50.
80 See OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation Through Aggressive Tax Planning 26 (OECD Publishing Aug. 2011).
81 See OECD, supra n. 60, comments by: Canadians for Tax Fairness, at 3; Chambre des Salaries Luxembourg; Eurodad, at 3; German Development Institute, at 1; ICRICT, at
5; Initiative for Human Rights Principles and Guidelines in Fiscal Policy in Latin America, at 4; International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), at 8; Oxfam, at 7;
Public Services International (PSI), at 1; Tax Justice Network (TJN), at 8; Tax Justice Network Africa, at 3; Tax Justice Network Israel, at 2; Trade Union Advising
Committee (TUAC), at 3; BEPS Monitoring Group (BMG), at 12; Intergovernmental Group of 24, at 3. Also see the comments by: (1) Businesses: BlaBlaCar, at 1; Santander,
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at 7. (3) Academics: Academic Political Scientists on International Taxation, at 4; Eva Escribano (UC3M), at 1; Institute for Austrian and International Tax Law (UW), at 8;
Shay (Harvard University); Sanghavi et al. (Maastricht University), at 1.
82 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 30; Also see M. Olbert & C. Spengel, International Taxation in the Digital Economy: Challenge Accepted?, 9(1) World Tax J. 3, at 35–37 (2017). These
authors also argue that user base or customer data can be regarded as intangibles. On the concept and importance of marketing intangibles, see D. Canapa, Trademarks and
Brands in Merger Control: An Analysis of the European and Swiss Legal Orders, International Competition Law Series Vol. 67, 48–49 (Wolters Kluwer 2016).
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marketing activities, sell its products/services in
Country S over the internet (or otherwise) and derive
substantial revenues from therein. Under the current
framework, the business income is taxed only in
Country R. In the latter scenario, Company R
could sell its products/services either, for example,
(1) through a related local limited sales or marketing
services provider which would report an arm’s length
service fee in Country S83; (2) through a limited risk
distributor (LRD) which would report an arm’s
length routine operating profit margin in Country
S; or (3) through a full-fledged distributor (FFD)
which will report an arm’s length entrepreneurial
operating profit margin in Country S. Nevertheless,
under all of these models, business income flows out
to Company R. Arguably, under some of these sce-
narios (especially, the first two situations) the
income (profit) linked to marketing intangibles also
moves out of Country S.84 Other situations in which
the marketing intangibles related profit moves out of
Country S relates to cases wherein Company R
licenses trademarks to a local taxpayer on which
royalties are required to be paid (for example, on a
standalone basis to FFDs or through franchising
arrangements with related or unrelated parties).
32. This proposal essentially argues that, if an
NRE supplier actively intervenes in the Market
Country and develops marketing intangibles therein,
then the latter State should have a right to tax the
profits (at least a part of it) linked to the marketing
intangibles. This is because an intrinsic function link
exists between the marketing intangibles and the
market jurisdiction.85 Accordingly, new nexus and
profit allocation rules will have to be developed to
ensure Market Country taxation. It should be noted
that the proposal clearly provides that profit alloc-
able to trade intangibles should be carved out.86
33. In order to determine the profit allocable to
marketing intangibles that would be reallocated to
the Market Country, one approach that is contem-
plated is to rely on a facts and circumstances analysis,
that is, the current transfer pricing approach. Under
this approach, the contribution of marketing intangi-
bles to the overall profits needs to be determined.
Thereafter, a portion of the profit linked to marketing
intangibles will be reallocated to the Market Country
in the form of a marketing intangibles adjustment.87
An alternate approach would be to rely on a residual
profit split analysis88 or a modified residual profit split
method. Under this approach, first, the total profits of
the MNE Group will need to be determined. Second,
routine profits that are allocable to all of the entities in
the MNE Group must be calculated. This could be
ascertained by either resorting to a transfer pricing
analysis or using a mechanical approach (simplified
conventions). Third, the routine profits will then be
deducted from the overall profits in order to arrive at
the residual profit. Fourth, the residual profit will then
be split between profit allocable to trade intangibles
and profit allocable to marketing intangibles. In order
to evaluate the contribution of marketing intangibles
to the residual profit, several approaches could be used
such as income / cost-based methods or predetermined
formulas (simplified conventions). Fifth, the profit
allocable to marketing intangibles would then be real-
located to the Market Country based on sales (or
depending on the business model, users of a platform).
5.3.2 Assessment of the Policy Rationale
34. Arguably, the policy rationale of this proposal
complies with the benefit principle. As argued pre-
viously, if the Market Country offers an appropriate
IP protection legal framework and considering the
fact that IP plays a significant role for HDBs and
traditional enterprises in the digitalized economy, in
the authors’ opinion, it could be argued that the
Market Country is justified to tax.
35. From a ‘sourcing’ perspective, a few commenta-
tors such as Professor Lawrence Lokken89 and Professor
Mitchell A Kane90 have argued that the use of IP
could be sourced to the Country wherein laws
Notes
83 See L. Spinosa & V. Chand, A Long-Term Solution for Taxing Digitalized Business Models: Should the Permanent Establishment Definition Be Modified to Resolve the Issue or Should the
Focus Be on a Shared Taxing Rights Mechanism?, 2018 46(6/7) Intertax 476, at 485.
84 OECD, supra n. 1, at paras 40–42.
85 Ibid., paras 31–32.
86 Ibid., para. 34.
87 Ibid., paras 45–46. This approach seems to have been dropped in the OECD, supra n. 2.
88 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 47; OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 28.
89 L. Lokken, The Sources of Income from International Uses and Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 Tax L. Rev. 233, 242 (1981).
90 M. A. Kane, A Defense of Source Rules in International Taxation, 32 Yale J. Regulation 311, 341–342 (2015).
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provide legal protection for that property.91 Other
commentators such as Paul Oosterhuis and Amanda
Parsons build on this line of thinking and state
that, under existing principles, ‘a strong argument
can be made that the jurisdiction where the base of custo-
mers or a network exists is a natural source for goodwill
and customer-based intangibles’. On the other hand, the
commentators also indicate, ‘It is not as obvious that
going-concern value or supplier-based intangibles should be
sourced to the jurisdiction of the ultimate customer.
Supplier-based intangibles constitute the value stemming
from the future purchase of goods or services from existing
suppliers. Therefore, it arguably would be more appropriate
to source these intangibles to the place of production. Going-
concern value includes the value attributable to the ability
of a trade or business to continue functioning and generat-
ing income without interruption; workforce in place is often
a key element of going-concern value. The appropriate source
would likely vary based on the nature of the particular
business but often would not be tied to the location of the
ultimate customer. Thus, a destination-based allocation of
these types of intangible income may not be appropriate’.92
Thus, when a non-resident supplier actively inter-
venes in the Market Country and develops marketing
intangibles (a large customer base or user network),
then that State is allowed to exercise its taxing right
over the profits (or at least a portion of the profits)
linked to those intangibles.
36. In the author’s opinion, it seems that several
NREs (HDBs or traditional) can actively intervene
over the internet or other communication means or
with local presence and develop intangibles such as
customer data, customer lists, and customer relation-
ships. At the same time, HDBs or traditional enter-
prises can actively intervene over the internet or
other communication means or with local presence
and develop their trademarks or tradenames. Under
the current framework, the Market Country does not
tax the ‘value’ linked to such intangibles (‘escaped
value’).93 Thus, the objective of the proposal is to
ensure that the Market Country taxes the escaped
value with respect to an intangible asset that is
‘sourced’ in that country. This said, the ‘source’ of the
intangible asset, intutively, seems stronger for busi-
nesses that sell consumer goods or consumer services
(either in a Business to Business or Business to
Consumer or in a franchising context) and businesses
that develop user networks as opposed to businesses
that sell raw material, capital goods or commmod-
ities to other businesses. Also, this approach would
be compliant with the opinion of one group of the
TAG Committee that expressed the opinion that,
under the ‘supply’ approach, the Market Country is
justified to exercise its taxing rights even when the
foreign supplier has no physical presence.94 This
approach also seems to be consistent with the value
creation concept as the Market Country will be
allocated taxing rights over the untaxed value of
the foreign supplier linked to that State.95
5.3.3 Assessment in Light of Policy Principles
37. The way this proposal has been presented may
not create issues related to ring fencing as it applies to
HDBs (for example, those discussed in sections 5.1 and
5.2) and traditional businesses. It thus seems to be
more neutral than the other proposals. This said, at
this stage, the scope of application of this proposal is
uncertain. Arguably, as the proposal will be intro-
duced as a general concept as opposed to specific
rules being developed for HDBs, it could be flexible
for accommodating new business models that are
consumer (or user) facing. Although several businesses
and business associations support this proposal as it
accords with the value creation concept,96 the biggest
challenge associated with the model is in relation to
Notes
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92 P. Oosterhuis & A. Parsons, Destination Based Income Taxation: Neither Principled Nor Practical?, 71 Tax L. Rev. 515, 522–524 (2018).
93 Typically, in situations of remote sales. In his thesis, Dr Oddleif Torvik, also argues that, depending on the business model, under the current framework, income from
marketing intangibles is not taxed in the Market Country. See O. Torvik, Transfer Pricing and Intangibles: US and OECD Arm’s Length Distribution of Operating Profits from IP
Value Chains, IBFD Doctoral Series Vol. 45, 770–772 (2019); Also see J. Bankman, M. A. Kane & A. Sykes, Collecting the Rent: The Global Battle to Capture MNE Profits,
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 527, 14–18 (25 Oct. 2018); OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 23.
94 OECD, supra n. 8, at para. 44.
95 OECD, supra n. 44, at para. 33.
96 See OECD, supra n. 60, For instance, the proposal is supported by the following commentators (1) Businesses: Booking.com, at 4; Carrefour, supra n. 81, at 2–3;
Johnson&Johnson, at 2; Procter & Gamble, at 4; Spotify, at 2; Uber, at 6. By (2) Business associations: 100 group, at 4; Accountancy Europe, at 3; Anitec-Assinform, at 2;
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the profit allocation mechanism that will be used to
calculate the ‘marketing intangible’ profit. The residual
profit split analysis, up to the extent that it uses an
arm’s length or facts and circumstances approach,
would clearly involve a high degree of subjectivity
and complexity. Undoubtedly, this could also lead to
tax uncertainty and a plethora of tax disputes. Also, it
would be fair to state that, due to its subjectivity, the
proposal would trigger substantial costs of compliance
for both taxpayers and tax administrations.
5.4 Interim Conclusion
38. All of the proposals raise significant chal-
lenges, and none of them are absolutely perfect.
This said, in the author’s view, a core issue that
must be resolved by policy makers is whether cross
border business income should be taxed based on the
‘supply’ approach or the ‘supply-demand’ approach?
39. The author’s opinion is that the former
approach should prevail for corporate income tax
purposes. This is primarily due to the reason that
the principle of value creation applies to corporate
income tax whereas the principle of destination
applies to VAT.97 In other words, VAT already
takes into consideration the presence of ‘consumption’
or ‘demand’ side factors.98 This approach would make
sense from the perspective of resorting to the general
equilibrium theory in international trade.99 If this
equilibrium is not maintained, then the production
country could also assert that a part of the VAT
taxable base should be allocated to it. This is because
consumption can only occur when there is produc-
tion, and the production country has offered an
appropriate framework to ensure the creation of
goods/services for consumption. As stated by
Professor Kemmeren, ‘ … If a customer’s market for goods
or services would be relevant for the allocation of the
production of income (wealth), then the producers market
should also be relevant for the allocation of the consumption
of wealth. This implies that we should assume that part of
the consumption takes place in the state of the producer of
the goods or services. Only then, the reasoning would be
consistent, since we have to take into account the tax system
as a whole and not taxes in isolation’.100
40. If the ‘supply’ approach is the starting point for
dividing the international corporate tax base, then
the user participation and the SEP proposals are
developed on unsound/debatable policy rationales as
they conflict with the author’s understanding of the
‘supply’ approach/‘value creation’ standard (which may
or may not be the common understanding of the
approach or standard). To elaborate, the author
takes the position that users cannot be considered
as ‘supply’ or ‘value creation’ factors. Hence, the user
participation proposal is conceptually flawed.
Similarly, the SEP proposal is built on a debatable
policy rationale as it incorporates the assumption
that the presence of a market needs to be rewarded.
41. This said, the ‘supply’ approach/‘value creation’
standard should not be interpreted in a manner that
focuses on or requires physical activities in a State.
As discussed previously, the ‘supply’ approach/‘value
creation’ standard allows the Market Country to tax a
foreign supplier’s intangible presence (or a part of
the profits that are linked to the value created by the
supplier) even if that NRE does not employ person-
nel in that State. Arguably, the marketing intangible
proposal accords with that approach/standard as
those intangibles can be ‘sourced’ to the Market
Country, especially, in a consumer facing or user
network oriented business. However, that proposal
raises several issues with respect to achieving cer-
tainty in relation to profit allocation. Thus, in order
to achieve certainty, the author’s agree with Collier
and Andrus who argue that countries, in general,
should ‘return to the issue of transfer pricing safe
harbours’.101 Accordingly, the author foresees the
application of a simplified residual profit split
Notes
Coalition of Netherlands based Technology Companies, supra n. 10, at 3; Computer & Communications industry association (CCIA Europe), at 2; Confederation of British
industries (CBI), at 15; Criteo, at 1; Digital Economy Group, supra n. 10, at 7; Digital Europe, at 7; European Ecommerce and Omni-Channel Trade Association (EMOTA),
at 3; International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), at 3; Keidanren, at 2; Silicon Valley Tax Directors Group (svtdg), at 2; Skadden, at 2; United States Council for
International Business (USCIB), at 3. By (3) academics: Becker Englisch (Muenster university); Danon & Chand (University of Lausanne), at 12–14; Hernandez (University
Clapes), at 1; Jimenez (University of Cadiz), at 6.
97 Although it is not extremely clear, it seems that, for a single source case, i.e. when all production and sales activities take place in one country, the Musgrave’s argue ‘taxation
by source is preferable’. Also, for multiple source cases, the Musgraves argue that the taxable base should be allocated to the country where the ‘capital operates’. See R. Musgrave
& P. Musgrave, Inter-nation Equity in Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup 78–85 (R. Bird & J. Head eds, University of Toronto Press 1972).
98 For a detailed discussion on why the supply approach should be preferred, see Kemmeren, supra n. 19, at 154–156.
99 Becker & Englisch, supra n. 3, at 164.
100 See Kemmeren, supra n. 19, at 155.
101 Collier & Andrus, supra n. 7, at 269–270. Also see J. Andrus & P. Oosterhuis, Transfer Pricing After BEPS: Where Are We and Where Should We Be Going, 95 Taxes Tax Mag.
89, 104 (Mar. 2017).
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allocation mechanism or, as otherwise stated, a safe
harbour (or rebuttable presumption)102 that will use
mechanical approximations or fixed contribution
percentages103 to approximate the allocation of prof-
its linked to marketing intangibles. In the next
section, the author further develops the solution.
6 RECOMMENDATION: THE DESIGN OF A
SOLUTION
6.1 Introductory Comments
42. The idea of this section is only to provide a
high-level overview of the design of a potential
solution, especially regarding profit allocation. It
is not the purpose of this section to examine the
solution in depth. It has been partially inspired by
the public comments that were submitted by
Skadden, Johnson & Johnson, the Digital Economy
Group, the Coalition of Netherlands Based
Technology companies, the consultation draft issued
by the New Zealand government, and the OECDs
work programme. Needless to say, a new taxing
right or profit allocation rule will need be intro-
duced at the domestic law and tax treaty level (also
an amendment may be required to the Transfer
Pricing guidelines), depending on the exact solution.
6.2 Nexus and Scope
43. Prior to discussing the profit allocation
mechanism, in the author’s view, the new taxing
right should be conceptualized as a new concept
of taxable income that is ‘sourced’ in the Market
jurisdiction104 with the source being the ‘market-
ing intangible’ (consumer or user base that has
been created by the suppliers efforts) located in
the market jurisdiction. Ideally, the nexus rule
should be designed based on global consolidated
turnover105 and local market turnover106
thresholds. The former threshold will indicate
that the MNE has substantial operations across
the globe whereas the latter threshold will
demonstrate that the MNE (or an entity in an
MNE) has a substantial economic link or connec-
tion with the market jurisdiction. In other words,
the local market revenue threshold indicates that
the MNEs enter into a jurisdiction to develop
marketing intangibles. In the author’s opinion,
the amounts employed in these thresholds should
be high in order to ensure that the administrative
burden of such source taxation is low. It is also
preferable not to use qualitative factors (as con-
templated in the Indian SEP proposal) as they
could lead to uncertain outcomes. The nexus
rule will also need a ‘degree of permanence’ to be
built into it in order to ensure that isolated/one-
off transactions are not caught by this provision.
This permanence could be indicated by resorting
to other objective thresholds such as, depending
on the business, number of users linked to a
particular country or the number of contracts
concluded with respect to sales made in a coun-
try. Furthermore, carve outs could be contem-
plated for some businesses which are not
consumer or user facing such as businesses in
the extractive industry (mining or oil and gas),
businesses that sell raw materials or commodities
or capital goods to other businesses (which are
processed or used in processing by the purchasing
business), businesses that are subject to regula-
tion and which already operate with substantial
business presence in the Market Country (for
example, certain business lines of banks and
insurance companies) as well as businesses that
are subject to special rules under the current
framework (such as shipping and airlines).
Ideally, this rule must be implemented through
a new distributive rule in order to ensure that
potential conflicts and overlaps with Article 5,
Notes
102 For a discussion on safe harbours or presumptions, see OECD, OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 2017 (OECD Publishing
2017), paras 4.95–4.133; V. Thuronyi, Tax Law Design and Drafting: Chapter 12, Presumptive Taxation vol 1, 3–6 (IMF 1996); A. Turina, Back to Grass Roots: The Arm’s Length
Standard, Comparability and Transparency: Some Perspectives from the Emerging World, 10(2) World Tax J. 295–348 (2018); S. Picciotto, Problems of Transfer Pricing and Possibilities
for Simplification, ICTD Working Paper 86, 29 (Box 4) (Nov. 2018).
103 OECD, supra n. 1, at paras 47 & 48.
104 OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 39.
105 Similar thresholds are found in draft proposals with respect to digital service taxes. See European Commission, supra n. 48; HM Treasury, supra n. 10. Also see comments by
Coalition of Netherlands based Technology Companies, supra n. 10, at 14–15; Digital Economy Group, supra n. 10, at 8.
106 Commentators supporting the development of nexus rules based on turnover include: B. Arnold, Threshold Requirements for Taxing Business Profits under Tax Treaties, 57(10)
Bull. Int’l Tax’n 476–492 (2003); Schön, supra n. 21, at 67; A. J. Cockfield, Balancing National Interests in the Taxation of Electronic Commerce Business Profits, 74 Tulane L. Rev.
133, 198–206 (1999). Other academics who support such thresholds (also the ‘supply-demand’ approach) include R. Avi-Yonah & O. Halabi, A Model Treaty for the Age of
BEPS, Law & Economics Working Papers, Paper 103, 15 (2014); R. Avi-Yonah, Designing a 21st century Taxing Threshold: Some International Implications of South Dakota vs.
Wayfair, Public law and Legal Theory research paper no. 611 (2018); Gadžo, supra n. 11, at 318–332. Also see OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 40.
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Article 7, and Article 9 are minimized.107 The
following profit allocation mechanism could be
built into that rule.
6.3 Profit (Loss) Allocation: Modified but
Simplified Profit Split Method
44. If the objective of a potential solution is to
achieve tax certainty, especially from a developing
country’s standpoint, then a solution to implement
the marketing intangibles proposal would be to resort
to a safe harbour108 that is built on return on sales109
or operating profit margins110 (operating profits/oper-
ating revenue). The author uses this indicator as it is
usually used in a transfer pricing context. Although,
not used in this section, a net profit margin (earnings
before taxation/operating revenue) could also be used
as it represents the true profitability of the business.
The solution presented here will be built on a con-
solidated basis as opposed to a separate entity basis as
all three proposals presented in the PCD follow the
‘global approach to determination of profit’.111 It is also
preferable to develop this safe harbour solution at the
consolidated level as opposed to a business line seg-
mentation approach or a regional approach as the
latter approaches raise significant data availability
and administration issues.112 The safe harbour will
need to be implemented in the context of a simplified
residual profit split analysis113 using a top-down
approach.114 Please note that the numbers used
in the following paragraphs are for illustrative
purposes only. A proper economic/statistical ana-
lysis will be required to justify any numbers.
45. As indicated in the PCD and the recent work
programme, various steps are required to implement
a residual profit split analysis.115 First, the total
profits of the MNE Group need to be determined.
For the purpose of the solution presented here, this is
required to understand the overall operating profit
margin of the Group. The information could be
determined, for instance, by examining the MNE’s
consolidated financial statements.116
46. Second, routine profits or a routine operating
profit margin must be determined. For instance, a pre-
determined margin could be developed which would
provide that the routine operating profit margin is
established at a certain percentage as opposed to using
a facts and circumstances transfer pricing analysis.
For the purpose of this solution, assume that this margin
is fixed at 5%.117 The percentage is inspired from
a recent document released by the Australian Tax
Administration in the content of inbound distribution
arrangements in Australia118 and the OECD work on
Low Value Added Services.119 This would imply that, if
the MNE Group’s overall operating profit margin is less
than 5%, then it would fall outside the scope of this
proposal.120
47. Third, residual profit or a residual operating
profit margin needs to be determined. This could
be achieved by deducting the routine operating
profit margin from the overall operating profit
margin. For example, if the MNE Group has an
overall operating profit margin of 45%, then 5%
will be allocated to routine operating profit mar-
gins whereas 40% will be allocated to a residual
operating profit margin.
Notes
107 OECD, supra n. 44, at para. 82.
108 Ibid., para. 75.
109 See Johnson&Johnson, supra n. 96, at 2.
110 See Skadden, supra n. 96, at 6. In other words, Earnings Before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) relative to sales.
111 OECD, supra n. 44, at para. 56.
112 OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 36.
113 See Skadden, supra n. 96, at 6; Johnson&Johnson, supra n. 96, at 2.
114 To understand this approach, see M. Devereux, A. Auerbach, M. Keen, P. Oosterhuis, W. Schön & J. Vella, Residual Profit Allocation by Income, Saïd Business School Working
Paper 19/01, 35 (2019).
115 OECD, supra n. 1, at paras 47 & 74; OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 29. It should be noted that the Programme of Work only discusses four steps.
116 See Skadden, supra n. 96, at 6 & 8–10. For large MNEs, such information can also be gathered from Country by Country reports. See OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and
Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing Oct. 2015).
117 For example, some authors (such as Professor Avi Yonah) have suggested a 7.5% mark-up for routine profits. See Andrus & Oosterhuis, supra n. 101, at 101.
118 Although issued in a different context, the Australian guidance states that distributors that earn an operating profit margin of at least 5.3% can be categorized as ‘low risk’
from a transfer-pricing audit standpoint. See AU: ATO, Practical Compliance Guideline, Transfer Pricing Issues Related to Inbound Distribution Arrangements 11 (PCG 2019/1).
119 OECD, supra n. 102, at Ch. 7.
120 See Skadden, supra n. 96, at 7; OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 29. The author is completely aware of the fact that low risk distribution margins could be lower.
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48. Fourth, the residual operating profit margin
will then be divided between trade intangibles and
marketing intangibles. The portion allocable to mar-
keting intangibles will be subject to the new taxing
right. Once again, a safe harbour in the form of a
predetermined formula could be developed which
would approximate the contribution of marketing
intangibles to the residual operating profit margin.121
One approach would involve comparing the consoli-
dated research and development costs of the MNE to
the consolidated marketing and sales expenses.122 For
example, if the MNE’s research and development
costs amount to USD 8 and sales and marketing
expenses amount to USD 2, then the split will be in
the form of an 80–20 split. However, such an
approach, even though it is easily implemented, will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each
MNE. Another approach could be to fix the formula
at a 50–50 division between trade and marketing
intangibles. This percentage could be inspired from
Section 936(h) of the US Internal Revenue Code that
provided for such a split related to a regime that
concerned the operations by US companies in US
possessions.123 However, such an excessive percentage
for marketing intangibles could be unreasonable espe-
cially if such intangibles have been developed by
activities of personnel outside the borders of the
Market jurisdiction. While several approaches could
be considered, for the purpose of this contribution,
the author will begin with the arbitrary split,124 that
is, a 75–25% split. Essentially, a 25% weight will be
allocated to marketing intangibles as the average life
of investments in marketing intangibles (at least in
some businesses) is usually shorter than the average
life of investments in trade intangibles (research and
development costs). For example, if the MNE Group
has a residual operating profit margin of 40%, then
10% of that margin (25%) will be allocated to mar-
keting intangibles related profit that is linked to
Market countries.
49. Fifth, the profit allocable to marketing intangibles
would then be reallocated to the Market Countries. The
reallocation can occur based on the sales that are made in
those countries. The location of sales could be deter-
mined by resorting to proxies used in a VAT context.
Also, depending on the business model, reallocation can
also be made to user countries (especially for advertisers)
to the extent that they are different from countries in
which sales are made.125
50. Illustration: Co G, a tax resident of Country G
(EU State), is the parent entity of an MNE Group that
is active in several countries. Co G has developed its
products in Country G and sells in that market and in
other markets. In Country X, the products are sold on
a remote basis. In Country Y, the products are sold
through a related distributor, Co Y, that reports an
arm’s length operating margin of 6%.
51. Financial information: The overall consoli-
dated operating revenue of the Group is USD 1,000,
and the overall operating profit is USD 450. The sales
to end customers in Country X and Country Y amount
to USD 200 and USD 300, respectively.
52. Solution: Under the proposed solution, the
overall operating profit margin of the Group is
45%. The deemed routine operating profit margin
is 5%. Accordingly, the deemed residual operating
profit margin is 40%. One fourth of that margin is
deemed attributable to marketing intangibles that
are linked to the Market Countries. This would lead
to the conclusion that the profit attributable to
marketing intangibles linked to the Market
Countries is 10% of the overall revenues, which
amounts to USD 100 (USD 1,000*10%). Country
X will be allocated USD 20 (100*200/1000 = 20)
and Country Y will be allocated USD 30 (100*300/
1000 = 30) of that profit. Local corporate income tax
must be paid on the reallocated profits. As indicated
in the program of work, taxes could either be col-
lected based on self-declaration or withholding
mechanisms. This would be the case in Country
X.126 It can also be foreseen that, in Country Y,
Co Y could be jointly liable with Co G to discharge
the tax liability127 (further consideration should be
given as to whether the reallocated profits should be
reduced by the profit already being reported by Co
Y, if the amount exceeds a pre agreed percentage as
Notes
121 Also see Grinberg, supra n. 51, at 30–36.
122 New Zealand Government, supra n. 47, at. 36.
123 See Skadden, supra n. 96, at 4–5; OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 29.
124 Grinberg, International Taxation supra n. 51, at 43–44; Coalition of Netherlands based Technology Companies, supra n. 10, at 15.
125 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 78.
126 OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 46.
127 See Skadden, supra n. 96, at 7; Coalition of Netherlands based Technology Companies, supra n. 10, at 19; Digital Economy Group, supra n. 10, at 12.
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discussed in the simplified distribution based
approach further below).
53. Losses: The proposal would also permit the
carry forward of losses. For example, if the MNE
Group has a negative overall operating profit margin
that would lead to marketing intangible related loss,
then that loss will be carried forward for set off
against marketing intangibles related profits for
future years. Thereafter, the profit (after taking into
consideration the losses) will be reallocated to the
market jurisdiction.128Also, special rules will need
to be developed to capture pre-existing losses.
54. If the taxpayers do not agree with the results
produced by the safe harbour, then they can certainly
rebut its application and offer their facts and circum-
stances analysis keeping in mind that their analysis
could be subjective which could then lead to disputes.
The analysis could be based on a product or service
line/business line/regional approach. Moreover, instead
of using fixed formulas, taxpayers can resort to a trans-
fer pricing analysis or/and a capitalized expenditure
analysis or a return on capital employed analysis129 in
order to arrive at profits that are allocable to marketing
intangibles. It should be noted that if this approach is
not used as a safe harbour (as understood in a transfer
pricing context) then it will clearly go beyond the
arm’s length principle. If implemented, this would
then represent an add on to the existing system.
Nevertheless, if a formulary solution is developed as
an add on to the exisiting system on a MNE Business
Line basis then this safe harbour could be used within
that approach as MNE business line information could
be difficult to gather.
55. The above solution represents a simple method
for implementing the marketing intangibles proposal.
That method only deals with allocating residual or
excess profits. Another approach that merits considera-
tion (in addition to the above proposal) is the distribu-
tion margin approach.130 The approach (or its
simplified version) merits consideration up to the
extent it incorporates safe harbours to enhance tax
certainty as opposed to allocating non rebuttable
deemed profit margins. For instance, when a MNE
operates with a distributor (LRD) in a jurisdiction, a
safe harbour could be developed which guarantees a
minimum return (example, a certain percentage on
sales depending on the industry in which the taxpayer
operates). The advantage of this approach is that it
offers upfront tax certainty to the distributor as in
recent years such entities have been subject to litigation
(for example, Advertising, Marketing and Promotion
(AMP) expenses in India) . A detailed discussion of that
approach is not made in this contribution.
6.4 Relief from Double Taxation
56. Ideally, the credit method should be used by
the residence State to provide relief from double
taxation.131 For example, If Country G (in the afore-
mentioned example) follows the credit method, then
the taxes paid in Country X and Country Y can be
credited against the corporate income tax for which
Company G is exposed. Of course, several issues arise
when multiple entities within an MNE group own
or use marketing intangibles. For example, consider
the situation of Company R in State R that has
developed marketing intangibles. Company R sells
its products in the State R market. Further, for its
overseas operations, Company R establishes a centra-
lized business model (Company P) in State P.
Company P employs the intangibles for its opera-
tions and derives business income on a remote basis
from several countries (including State S) and pays
an arm’s length amount of royalties to Company R.
If a tax liability arises in State S for the MNE Group,
then the question arises as to who is the taxpayer to
whom the tax liability could be attributed, i.e. is it
Company R (who is the owner of the intangible) or
Company P (the taxpayer that has used the
intangible)?132 In this case, both entities could be
considered as the relevant taxpayers for the purpose
of this solution. Moreover, it could also be foreseen
that both States should provide the relief, that is, to
the owner of the intangible as well as the user of the
intangible within the Group. This would imply that
both State R (Company R) and State P (Company P)
Notes
128 Coalition of Netherlands based Technology Companies, supra n. 10, at 14–15; Digital Economy Group, supra n. 10, at 10–11. Also see OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 38.
129 Oosterhuis & Parsons, supra n. 92, at 532–533.
130 See Johnson&Johnson, supra n. 96, at 2–3; OECD, supra n. 2, at paras 32–35.
131 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 80; New Zealand Government, supra n. 47, at para. 4.37. Even exemption countries should switch to the credit method. For instance, Art. 23(A)
(2) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2017) mandates exemption countries to follow the credit method for dividend and interest income. Alternatively, corresponding
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132 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 83; OECD, supra n. 2, at para. 41. Also see Coalition of Netherlands based Technology Companies, supra n. 10, at 18.
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could provide the relief. The relief could be divided
in a predetermined proportion. For instance, if
Company P has a profit margin of 15% (pre royalty)
and pays 5% royalties to Company R (an arm’s
length royalty) then the releif could be split two
thirds and one third.
6.5 Dispute Prevention and Resolution
57. If the simplified profit split mechanism will be
developed based on predetermined formulas, the
determination of the profit to be allocated to the
market jurisdiction should not be an overly compli-
cated exercise. However, issues could arise if a MNE
Business Line approach is used. Moreover, disputes
could arise on the identification of the taxable person
and the corresponding relief from double taxation
that the relevant State of residence must provide to
its resident person. In these circumstances, it would
be appropriate to develop rules such as multilateral
competent authority arrangements that primarily
focus on dispute prevention mechanisms (focussing
more on obtaining consensus for predetermined for-
mulas, providing guidance on MNE Business
Lines as well as rules regarding identification of the
taxable person). Also, it will be desirable that more
countries (including developing countries) adopt
mandatory arbitration133 as a dispute resolution
mechanism if a facts and circumstances analysis is
built into the proposal (either in the simplified
method or as a back up to the simplified distribution
method).
7 FUNDAMENTAL REFORMS FOCUSSING ON
‘DEMAND’ SIDE SOLUTIONS
58. Some commentators and a recent IMF Paper134
have argued for more ‘demand’ side solutions. The
solutions can be grouped into two broad categories.
The first category, the residual profit allocation
mechanism (RPA), allocates routine returns to ‘source’
countries in accordance with the arm’s length prin-
ciple whereas residual returns are allocated to the
market jurisdictions.135 The second category, desti-
nation based cash flow taxes (DBCFT), ensures that
the seller does not pay domestic corporate taxes in its
country on exports. The tax, depending on the
manner in which it is adopted, allocates returns
(from exports) to the market jurisdictions as it is
based on a destination framework.136
59. At the core, the supporters of these proposals
contend that ‘production’, ‘origin’, ‘supply’, or ‘value crea-
tion’ factors (such as employees in combination with
intangibles) are mobile. Accordingly, MNEs can move
these factors from high tax to low tax jurisdictions and
engage in profit shifting. Also, countries may compete
with each other in order to attract such factors within
their territory by offering tax incentives in the form of
reducing corporate tax rates. Therefore, the current
framework encourages profit shifting (now genuine)
and tax competition. On the other hand, the propo-
nents of the ‘demand’ side solutions argue that their
proposals either restrict (under RPA) or do not lead to
(under DBCFT) profit shifting/tax competition as they
are linked to consumers in a market. As customers are
relatively immobile, an MNE does not have an incen-
tive to move, for instance, its ‘production’ factors to a low
tax country. At the same time, countries will not
engage in tax competition to attract ‘production’ factors.
60. While these proposals may have their merits
from the perspective of profit shifting and tax com-
petition considerations137 (efficiency aspects), a general
question arises as to why the Market Country should
obtain substantial taxing rights over income that is
substantially ‘sourced’ in another country. Does this
proposal not directly conflict with the ‘benefits’ princi-
ple? In the authors’ opinion, this should definitely be
the case, especially for the DBCFT (and, to a lesser
extent, for the RPA system). Also, if the proponents
of these proposals argue for a full/part destination
framework for corporate income tax then why should
VAT not be based on the residence or origin principle
to maintain an equilibrium for State finances?138 Also,
if corporate tax and VAT are paid in the destination
country, the proponents of these proposals do not
seem to realize that the ‘loser’ countries (smaller
Notes
133 OECD, supra n. 1, at para. 84; OECD, supra n. 2, at paras 43–44.
134 IMF, Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy, Policy Paper No. 19/007 (IMF Mar. 2019).
135 Ibid., paras 86–99; Devereux et al., supra n. 114; Collier & Andrus, supra n. 7, at 286–289.
136 A. Auerbach, M. Devereux, M. Keen & J. Vella, Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation, Saïd Business School Working Paper 2017/09 (2017); IMF, supra n. 134, at paras 61–
73; Collier & Andrus, supra n. 7, at 290–293.
137 For a critical analysis of a destination based corporate income tax see Kemmeren, supra n. 19, at 155–162. The author demonstrates that a DBCFT system could also
encourage double non taxation outcomes if the system is not universally adopted.
138 Kemmeren, supra n. 19, at 149.
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markets) will increase tax rates for individuals (income
tax or wealth taxes) to fund public coffers. Thus, these
‘demand’ side proposals pose severe threats on public
finance considerations. The attractiveness of such pro-
posals will also decrease if countries adopt the Pillar II
proposals, that is, the income inclusion as well as the
base eroding payment rules.139
8 CONCLUSION
61. This contribution supports the ‘supply’ framework
as opposed to the ‘supply-demand’ or a ‘demand’ frame-
work for international corporate taxation. This said, the
‘supply’ framework also permits a Market Country to
exercise its jurisdiction to tax over a non-residents
supplier’s business profits if that taxpayer has a suffi-
cient connection in that State. Otherwise stated, the
framework allows a Market Country to tax the value
created by the non-resident supplier in that State till
the extent the income can be ‘sourced’ therein. After
assessing the three proposals and considering their
rationale and broad tax policy principles, the
Marketing intangibles proposal appears to be the only
proposal that comports with the ‘supply’/‘value creation’
framework. Thus, from a nexus perspective, a positive
‘source’ rule,140 i.e. a new marketing intangible related
‘source’ rule would need to be developed. However, the
most significant challenge with the proposal is in rela-
tion to its profit allocation mechanism. Thus, this
contribution proposes the design of a simplified resi-
dual profit split method. Further research is essential to
answer the technical questions that arise in the context
of the simplified method (especially relief from double
taxation and collection mechanisms) as well as to jus-
tify the formulaic numbers that will be used in its
various steps. In addition to a simplified profit split
method, consideration should be given to a simplified
distribution based approach (a safe harbour that will be
backed by a transfer pricing facts and circumstances
analysis). Also, from an implementation standpoint,
consideration should be given towards developing a
true Multilateral Tax Convention as opposed to the
existing Multilateral Instrument, which modifies bilat-
eral tax treaties.
Notes
139 OECD, supra n. 1, at paras 88–102; OECD, supra n. 2, at paras 50–77.
140 Professor Wilkie aruges that the BEPS recommendations have created negative source rules. See S. Wilkie, New Rules of Engagement? Corporate Personality and the Allocation of
‘International Income’ and Taxing Rights, in Tax Treaties After the BEPS Project: A Tribute to Jacques Sasseville 365–371 (B. J. Arnold ed., Canadian Tax Foundation 2018). For a
critical analysis of the ‘source concept’, see H. J. Ault & D. F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S System and Its Economic Premises, NBER Working
Paper Series no. 3056, 26–29 (Aug. 1989).
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